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STATE ACTION AND THE PUBLIC FUNCTION DOCTRINE: ARE
THERE REALLY PUBLIC FUNCTIONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Flagg Bros., Inc., v. Brooks' is the latest in a series of cases pertaining
to the issue of state action. In that case, the Court decided that "dispute
resolution" was not a public function2 such that the actions of a private
party must adhere to constitutional standards. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, added that, when considering such
functions as education, police and fire protection, and tax collection: "We
express no view as to the extent, if any, to which a city or State might be
free to delegate to private parties the performance of such functions and
thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. '' 3 It is the
purpose of this comment to consider if, or under what circumstances, these
or other functions would be classified as public functions so that the state
action principle would apply.'
The state action principle is important because certain constitutional
standards must be adhered to only by the states and their subdivisions.
A litigant seeking to impose such standards on a private party must prove
a relationship between the private party and the state so that the action
of the private party may be attributed to the state itself. If proven, the
action of the private party is said to be "state action" and the constitu-
tional standards are imposed on such action.
8
1. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). Respondent had been evicted from her apartment and appellant
had been called to store her possessions. For failure to pay the storage charges, appellant
notified respondent of its intention to sell her possessions as per New York Uniform Commer-
cial Code § 7-210. Subsection (1) of that provision reads in part ". . . a warehouseman's lien
may be enforced by public or private sale of the goods .... Id. at 151. Respondent did not
assert that appellant violated this statute.
2. Id. at 161.
3. Id. at 163-64. Mr. Justice Rehnquist refers in a footnote here to the case of Griffin v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), which he states does not apply. Griffin concerned the arrest
of Negroes on private property for criminal trespass by an agent of the property who had been
deputized by the local sheriff's department. Since the agent acted not under the authority of
a private police department, but rather "under color of his authority as a deputy sheriff,"
the Court held that when "an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act
under that authority, his action is state action." Id. at 131, 135. The concept of the public
function doctrine was thus inapplicable in Griffin.
4. There are other doctrines, not the subject of this comment, under which state action
may be found. The inapplicability of the public function doctrine does not preclude a finding
of state action for another reason. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 164.
5. See L.H. TRinE, AzEmcN CONsrrtruroNAL LAw 1147 (1978).
6. Id. See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958).
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II. THE PUBLIC FUNCTION DOCTRINE
A. Overview
Over the years several doctrines have evolved which categorize the kinds
of situations under which state action may be found." This comment is
concerned with only one of these doctrines, that of the public function.
Though it may be difficult to determine in a given case which doctrine was
the basis of the holding,8 the essence of the public function doctrine is that
certain functions are public in nature, and that, even in the absence of any
other reason for finding state action, a private party performing that func-
tion will be held to the constitutional standard.9 A significant problem,
however, is that "[n]o satisfactory criteria exist to determine what is or
is not inherently governmental for this purpose."' 0 Recognizing this, var-
ious legal writers have sought to develop alternatives for the traditional
ways in which the Supreme Court decides state action cases." Without
accepting or rejecting such alternatives, an attempt will be made here to
formulate a basis for anticipating the Supreme Court's application of the
public function doctrine in various situations. This is not to suggest that
the term "public function" shall be defined; rather, that the concept of
"public function doctrine" may be examined, notwithstanding the absence
of such a definition.
B. Historic Application
The public function doctrine was initially developed in Marsh v.
Alabama,"' a case which involved a town that was totally owned and oper-
ated by a private company.'3 It was held that the constitutional standards
of free speech could not be abridged by the company on the basis of private
property rights.'4 Since the company was performing all the normal munic-
7. See note 4 supra. These other doctrines may be expressed under such terms as
"authorization and encouragement" or "nexus." See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at
164; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (a public utility is not
subject to the state action principle merely because it is state regulated when the function is
not a state obligation and the wrong complained of was not sufficiently connected to the
state).
8. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 158.
9. TaIE, supra note 5, at 1163.
10. Id.
11. J.E. NowAK, R.D. ROTUNDA AND I.N. YOUNG, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 473-75 (1978); TRIBE,
at 1147-74; Thompson, Piercing The Veil of State Action: The Retisionist Theory and a
Mythical Application to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. Rv. 1
12. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
13. Id. at 502.
14. Id. at 508-09.
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ipal functions, it must be bound by the restrictions imposed on municipali-
ties, and these superseded private property rights."
In every other public function case to be decided by the Supreme Court,
the issue was narrowed to the consideration of a single function, as opposed
to the broad spectrum of powers held by the company in Marsh. Specifi-
cally, the election process" and municipal parks'7 were held to be con-
trolled by the public function doctrine. Yet a public utility was not so
controlled.' There appears to be no rational basis for these decisions if only
the function itself is considered.' 9 The Court itself has stated that the
specific facts of the case must be considered,"0 but it is possible to antici-
pate future cases by analyzing the criteria applied by the Court in such
cases.
C. Criteria for Application of the Public Function Doctrine
A specific test for the application of the public function doctrine has
never been created by the Court,2' but two tests can be formulated from
the statements made by the Court on various occasions.
The first test is created by considering the following limitations: 1) the
private party is exercising powers traditionally and exclusively reserved to
the state,n 2) the power is traditionally associated with sovereignty,n 3) the
power is one which the state itself is obligated to perform,24 and 4) the
power is an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign.2
Though not appearing in all of these limitations, exclusivity is a neces-
sity under this test, as stated in Flagg Bros. 2 The word itself is not defined
in Flagg Bros. or other public function cases, but Mr. Justice Rehnquist
indicates its meaning in Flagg Bros. when he states that "the proposed sale
. . .is not the only means of resolving this purely private dispute."
15. Id. at 509.
16. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
17. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
18. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
19. See TRmE, supra note 5, at 1163.
20. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
21. See TIUsE, supra note 5, at 1148-49; NoWAK, supra note 11, at 456.
22. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 352.
23. Id. at 353.
24. Id.
25. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 160. See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. at 353 (exclusive prerogative of the state).
26. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 158-59.
27. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
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For the most part, these limitations appear to be mErely restatements
of each other, each perhaps adding a further refinement. The
"traditionally associated with sovereignty" limitation, is clearly incom-
plete by itself according to Mr. Justice Rehnquist 5 Exclusivity must be
added. The term "reserved" appears to be more limiting than
"associated, '29 but when the latter is read as "exclusively associated" the
difference fades. "Prerogative" refers to an exclusive privilege, "0 and so
merely paraphrases the other terms. As to any distinction between the
terms "state" and "sovereign," it has already been held that states are
sovereign, except as limited by the United States Constitution.'
The limitation that the state itself must be obligated to perform the
function does add something new, although not inconsistent with the oth-
ers. The other limitations state that only the state may perform the func-
tion. As a corollary, the state must perform the function if it is to be done
at all. This limitation was the primary reason that no public function was
found in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., since the state in that case
regulated public utilities but was under no obligation to perform those
activities itself.32
The sum of these limitations is the first test, which may be stated: the
public function doctrine will apply if a private party performed a function
which is traditionally, exclusively reserved to the state, and the state is
obligated to perform that function.3  Flagg Bros. did not discuss the second
half of this test, but it was not necessary since exclusivity was found not
to be present. 3
If this were the only test, the decision in Evans v. Newton3 1 is not ex-
plained. In that case, a city was devised land to be used as a park for white
persons only."6 After building, operating and serving as trustee of the park
for a number of years, the city asked the lower court to be relieved as
28. Id. at 158.
29. Compare "reserve" as having been set apart, and "associate" as connected in any of
various ways. WEasTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1931 and 132 (1971).
30. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1345 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
31. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941).
32. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 353.
33. This will be referred to throughout this comment as the first bast. Note particularly
the use of the word "perform." A performer is the party acting, in thiE. case acting in lieu of
the government. A mere "consumer" of the function is thus not included. In addition, there
is nothing in this test (or the subsequent test) to suggest that all actions of such a party are
subject to the doctrine, for it is only those relating to performance of the function in question
that are affected.
34. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 160.
35. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
36. Id. at 297.
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trustee because it cduld not comply with the discriminatory provisions of
the will.3 7 Private trustees were then appointed." Although the record was
unclear as to whether the city continued to maintain the park,3" the Su-
preme Court held that the private trustees could not discriminate either.'"
In Flagg Bros., Mr. Justice Rehnquist explains Evans by suggesting that
the issue of exclusivity was not relevant there.4' Rather, he suggests, the
fact that the city continued its maintenance of and concern for the facility
implicated direct state activity and not the state action principle involving
a private party. 2 While reasonable on its face, this comment does not
consider several important factors: 1) While the city may have continued
its "maintenance and concern," this is not stated in the record;43 2) The
Court in Evans made these statements:
Like the streets of the company town in Marsh v. Alabama, supra, the elec-
tive process of Terry v. Adams, supra, and the transit system of Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, supra, the predominant character and purpose
of this park are municipal.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot but conclude that the
public character of this park requires that it be treated as a public institution
subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who
now has title under state law.4'
This strongly suggests that the public function doctrine was being applied;
and 3) In Jackson, the Court includes municipal parks as public functions,
citing Evans."
If Mr. Justice Rehnquist is correct, then the only relevant limitations in
Evans are that the city had formerly owned the facility and that it still
provided maintenance and concern for it. That the facility is a park is
irrelevant. Maintenance and concern are not defined. Conceivably, cutting
the grass under contract and providing for police patrols could qualify.
Only if maintenance and concern are equated with "control" does Mr.
Justice Rehnquist's statement seem reasonable, and there is little basis for
37. Id. at 297-98.
38. Id. at 298.
39. Id. at 301, 304 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White).
40. Id. at 302.
41. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 159 n.8.
42. Id.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 302. Note, however, the reference to Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) which, at 462, indicates it was decided on the "nexus"
doctrine. This is reiterated in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 352, and
further demonstrates confusion as to which doctrine is being applied.
45. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 352.
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such equation in Evans.4" To accept his statement is to expand the concept
of state action beyond previous limits."
Rejecting his statement does not necessarily mean that Evans is good
law. Evans essentially stated that where 1) there is a tradition of municipal
control, 2) the tradition had become firmly established, and 3) the function
is open to all persons, the public function doctrine applies." Two cases,
Jackson and Flagg Bros., must be examined to see if they overrule Evans
by implication."
Part of the test previously stated is that the state must be obligated to
perform the function. This requirement was established in Jackson.'" If the
facts of Jackson are not distinguishable from Evans, then the requirement
in Jackson should apply to Evans. In Jackson, the state had in fact not
performed the function, certainly not exclusively. 5' The Jackson Court
clearly states that the "case would be quite a different one" if the function
was "traditionally associated with sovereignty" and only then goes on to
discuss the obligation to perform.5 2 Evans, involving a function that was
actually performed, is thus threatened only on the basis of exclusivity.1
But Evans was decided after several other public function doctrine cases,
each of which met the exclusivity limitation." If, as the Jackson Court
stated, Evans was a public function case,55 then either the exclusivity
limitation did not apply, or exclusivity meant something different in
Evans.
46. In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 301, the Court states it may be "assumed" that before
the city relinquished its status as trustee it "swept, manicured, watered, patrolled, and
maintained" the park. The Court then continues: "If the municipality remains entwined in
the management or control of the park, it remains subject to the restra nts of the Fourteenth
Amendment..." (emphasis added). It is possible that the court was directly implying that
such activities constitute management and control, but the mere provision of such services,
to the extent that they are not routinely provided to private property owners, does not
necessarily indicate who is paying for or has decision-making ability over such services.
47. If, for example, the city sold any property (not a park) and continued to perform any
maintenance activities, as under a contract or lease agreement, the actions of the new owner
as related to that property would be state action.
48. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 301.
49. Numerous cases since 1966 have referred to Evans, but it appears that only the two
cases cited actually consider the issue of a park as a public function in such reference.
50. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 353.
51. Id. at 351 n.8.
52. Id. at 353. The inference is that if the state in fact performed or, in the absence of actual
performance at least had an obligation to perform, then the public utility would have been a
public function. The obligation is not in addition to actual performance, but is in lieu of it.
53. "Tradition" is not in question, the Evans Court having decided -hat it applied in that
case. 382 U.S. at 301.
54. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
55. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 352.
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The problem is that the word "exclusively" does not stand alone in the
first test; it is connected to "reserved," or, alternatively, to "associated"
or "prerogative." This means that only the state has the right to perform
the function, absent a delegation. The words used by the Evans Court do
not suggest that "reserved" or "associated" or "prerogative" apply.
Rather, the Evans Court indicated that its concern was with the actual
performance, rather than the right to perform.
5 6
Application of the word "exclusive" to the Evans decision is therefore
not inappropriate, but there is exclusivity only in the sense of performance.
Any private party may have the right to perform (i.e., operate a park), but
where only the state or its subdivision actually performs, Evans suggests
that the function may be subject to the public function doctrine.5 7
To determine exactly when that doctrine will apply, the three Evans
limitations must be examined. The first is that there is a tradition of
municipal control. 6 As explained above, in light of Jackson, "control"
must be understood to mean actual performance. Mere regulatory control
is insufficient. 9
"Tradition" is a part of both the first and second Evans limitations; in
the second instance, the tradition (of municipal control) must be firmly
established. 0 In Evans, the city had operated the park for about fifty
years. " The Evans Court did not dwell on this point, however, and a more
reasonable interpretation of "tradition" and "firmly established" is a
subjective one. The question would be whose standards would apply. The
basic issue is, of course, whether this is a public function, and the courts
will ultimately decide the question. But, as a reference, and one that is
reasonable in Evans, the persons who are users, or potential users, of the
facility would determine the question.2 Restated, it is suggested that the
56. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 301.
57. It is not that Evans asserts the right of others to perform, but that Evans does not
prohibit it. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the fact that parks are involved,
and there exists no requirement, at least none suggested in Evans, that parks may only be
operated by the state.
58. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 301.
59. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 353, citing Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
60. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 301.
61. This is approximate, the date of acquisition not being stated. Id. at 297.
62. This reference is not stated, or even suggested, in Evans, but there must be some basis
to determine when a function is "firmly established" as under municipal control. If all parks
were considered, then there would never be a basis to so hold, since some are privately owned.
So this one park must be the reference, and the issue would be whether this park was so
established. But if this park was created just last year, would that be sufficient? The resolu-
tion is not a matter of law, but of fact, and to determine that fact a standard must be
1979]
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public function doctrine would apply when, in the opinion oF the court, the
persons actually and potentially 3 served by the function commonly under-
stand that the function is a public function, such understanding being
shaped by the actual history of that particular function. Alternatively, is
it reasonable to think that such persons would consider this to be a public
function?
This is not the entire test of Evans; it also includes exclusivity and
actual performance. In addition, there is the third Evans limitation: that
the function is open to all persons. 4 This third limitation s also denoted
by such catchwords as "municipal in nature,"' ' "serves the community,""
"public character""7 and "public institution." '68 Interestingly, the Evans
Court refers to fire and police departments as being similar in character."9
There is no reference in Evans or elsewhere as to the limitations such
phrases have, except possibly the previously discussed footnote in Flagg
Bros."' As was there suggested, an overly broad reading of Evans could
destroy the conceptual limits of state action. But not everything a state or
municipality does is open to all persons or serves the community. Some
government activities merely relate to the business of running a govern-
ment and relate to service to the community only in the sense that it is a
government, and not a business, that is performing. WhilE it may be un-
wise to create an unbending rule on this subject, a rough guide might be
whether a class of persons may benefit from or be affected by the function.
"Class" is used because there are many functions which serve the com-
munity but have certain requirements which exclude some persons. In-
deed, in Evans, not only non-whites but even white adult males could be
excluded by the terms of the applicable Georgia law.7 ' The mere fact that
white men could be excluded should not take the park out of the public
function class, if it otherwise belongs there." By limiting the guide to those
established. Evans assumes that the control had been firmly established without specifying
why. The attempt here is to suggest a basis for making that determination.
63. If only those actually served are to be considered, then the understanding of the non-
whites who were denied access to the park in Evans would be irrelevant.
64. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 301 ("It is open to every white person, there being no
selective element other than race.").
65. Id.
66. Id. at 302.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See note 41 supra.
71. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 305 n.1 and accompanying text.
72. Other examples might be a public library which restricts use to those who pay a fee; a
public school which limits enrollment by grades, tests scores, etc.
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functions which benefit or affect the class, mere housekeeping chores of the
government would be eliminated, except in the unusual circumstance that
a class of persons actually was affected. "Class" is restricted to the concept
of a named group of persons, and a government action benefitting or affect-
ing only certain designated persons would not apply.73
Thus, the second test, announced in Evans and modified somewhat by
Jackson is: the public function doctrine will apply if a function was ac-
tually performed by the state or its subdivision and not performed within
that state or subdivision by a private party, if the function benefited or
affected a class of persons within the state or subdivision, and if the per-
sons benefitted or affected, whether actually or potentially, perceived the
function to be a public function. 74
Having thus stated the test, it yet remains unresolved that it was not
overruled by Flagg Bros. Evans was not explicitly overruled, but this may
be because of the Flagg Bros. Court's interpretation of Evans.7' Implicitly,
there are two indications that Evans was not overruled. First, the opinion
specifically states that Gilmore v. City of Montgomery is not overruled. 7,
While it is arguble that Gilmore was a public function case, 77 the Flagg
Bros. Court indicates that it so interprets it.75 Gilmore concerned exclusive
use of public parks by segregated private schools, the park being operated
by the YMCA.79 While the user of the park was an educational institution, ""
the function actually involved was a park, not education. 8' Consequently,
73. A private bill naming an individual or a government contract with a single named party
would not constitute a "class," but that bill or contract could fall within the doctrine if a
class of persons not a party to the bill or contract was affected by it.
74. This will be referred to as the second test, or the Evans test. It may be suggested that
this second test, if good law, totally supplants the first test. While the second test may be
less restrictive in many situations, this is not always true. Under the second test, a defendant
private party may escape imposition of the doctrine by showing that other private parties had
previously performed that same function within the jurisdiction of that government. Under
the first test, since the function is the prerogative of the state and reserved to it, the mere
fact that others had performed the function and thus usurped state power would be immater-
ial.
75. See note 41 supra.
76. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 163.
77. "[Hjere, as in Burton, the question of the existence of state action centers in the
extent of the city's involvement in discriminatory actions by private agencies using public
facilities . . ." making the city a "joint participant." Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417
U.S. 556, 573 (1974). This is essentially the "nexus" doctrine as opposed to the public function
doctrine.
78. Section III of Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 157-64, is exclusively concerned
with consideration of the public function doctrine.
79. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. at 560, 566.
80. Id. at 565-66.
81. Id.
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in Flagg Bros., Gilmore is considered a public function case. and the func-
tion in question was a park, and parks cannot meet the strict first test
stated earlier, as formulated in Jackson and repeated in Flagg Bros. Thus,
if parks may be a public function, the only case to so hold is Evans, and
that must still apply. 2 The second indication that Flagg Bros. did not
overrule Evans is that the Flagg Bros. decision would not have been differ-
ent under Evans. The primary reason for this result is that the second test's
exclusivity rule is not met. Traditionally, private parties could resolve
disputes without state action.8 3 Considering only the specific type of dis-
pute in question does not change this. At most, the available remedy might
differ if the state was involved, 4 but this does not change the nature of the
function. Even as to remedies, the parties might have reached the same
result in the absence of state involvement." Additionally, although only as
an evidentiary matter, the complainant in Flagg Bros. had apparently not
proven that the necessary perception existed, as required in the second
test. "
I. APPLICATION OF THE TESTS
A. Prior Cases
One of the basic problems with understanding the public function doc-
trine has been the relationship between the doctrine and the function
itself. 7 Under the two tests above, however, it is evident that a given
function may or may not cause invocation of the doctrinE depending on
several variables.
In each case in which the public function doctrine was applied, there was
a qualification made to the assertion that the case was decided on a public
function basis. In Marsh, there was a balancing of the rights of the par-
ties.8 In Nixon v. Condon, the Court left unresolved the right of the Demo-
cratic Party members to set membership standards. 9 In Terry v. Adams,
82. If Gilmore is not a public function case, then this argument does not strictly apply;
but since the opinion in Flagg Bros. viewed Gilmore along such lines, it does weigh upon the
intent of Flagg Bros. to overrule Evans.
83. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 160-61.
84. Id. at 162 n.12.
85. Id.
86. At most, the respondents merely assert that they perceived dispute resolution as a
public function. Id. at 157.
87. Compare, for example, "our cases make it clear that the conduct of the elections
themselves is an exclusively public function" with "[tihe doctrine ... encompasses only
state-regulated elections or elections conducted by organizations which in practice produce
'the uncontested choice of public officials'." Id. at 158.
88. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 509.
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the Court emphasized that the winner of the Jaybird primary was virtually
assured of winning the actual election." In Evans, there is a suggestion that
state action is involved because the courts are enforcing a discriminatory
provision." If company towns, elections and parks were always public func-
tions subject to constitutional standards, all of these things would be to-
tally irrelevant. Whether or not such points are irrelevant can best be seen
by considering these cases under the two public function doctrine tests
established above.
Marsh clearly falls under the first test, since the overall operation of a
municipal government is traditionally and exclusively reserved to the
state, and the state, through its subdivision, is obligated to and does in fact
exercise such operations.
Nixon v. Condon, however, was decided on the basis of a grant of power
by the state to the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party.92 The
Committee would otherwise not have had such power23 The first test re-
quires that the function be traditionally, exclusively reserved to the state.
Yet the Nixon Court conceded that the function under dispute was re-
served not to the state, but to the party members meeting at convention.'
The second test likewise would not apply because the requirement that the
function not be performed by a private party cannot be met, assuming that
at some prior time the party members had in fact exercised their powers.9 '
Under other state action doctrines, this case may have been properly de-
cided, but it is not a public function doctrine case. Consider, though, that
this could have been a public function doctrine case if the Court had not
relied on the statutory grant of powes or left unresolved the right of the
members in convention to discriminate.9 6
Terry considered a pre-primary system which determined the results of
the actual election. 7 If the Jaybirds in Terry had conducted the formal
election, the doctrine would apply because of the first test: tradition, ex-
clusivity, reserved to the state, and state obligation. Since the result of the
Jaybird primary was, in effect, to determine the election, the first test
89. 286 U.S. at 84. This issue was resolved in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
90. 345 U.S. at 469.
91. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 302.
92. 286 U.S. at 85, 89.
93. Id. at 88.
94. Id at 84.
95. Regardless of whether the party members had specifically acted in convention to pro-
hibit non-whites from joining or voting in primaries, it is not unreasonable to assume that
the members had made, at some time, rules relating to membership or voting requirements.
96. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
97. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. at 469-70.
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would apply for the same reasons. But Terry leaves open the question of
infringements which do not actually affect the right to vote. If the conduct
of the pre-primaries themselves is a state function meeting either test, then
it makes no difference that the results of the pre-primary do not conclu-
sively determine the outcome of the actual election. The public function
doctrine will apply. But where the pre-primaries are not public functions
under either of the two tests, mere regulation by the state is insufficient,
and the doctrine will not apply except when the pre-primary is determina-
tive of the actual election.9 8
In Evans, even if the function is limited to the one park in question, the
first test does not apply because of the lack of any state prerogative. The
second test does apply because: 1) the city had performed; 2) only the city
had operated the park; 3) it served the community; and 4) there was cause
to believe that people regarded the park as a public function. The second
test does not require that the city continue to maintain an interest in the
park once all of the test's elements have been met.9
B. Application of the Tests to Education, Fire and Police Protection and
Tax Collection ""
1. Education
As a general rule, education lacks exclusivity and would meet neither
98. In Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), the Court held that non-whites could not
be barred from Democratic primaries. The Court indicated two explanations for its opinion:
1) that the conduct of the primaries was a function of the state and the Democrats were acting
under delegated power (public function doctrine); or 2) that primaries were subject to state
regulation and an absence of regulations on this particular topic was deliberate (authorization
and encouragement).
99. Under both tests, exclusive performance by the state precludes, in fact if not in law,
performance by private parties. If the public function issue is to be raised at all, a private
party must actually perform the function at some point. Under the first test, any such
performance is sufficient to invoke the doctrine if only the state had the right to perform.
Under the second test, however, the question is whether such performance invokes the doc-
trine on the one hand, or invalidates it (on the basis of non-exclusive performance) on the
other. Although the facts of Evans do not suggest an answer, altering those facts somewhat
might suggest one approach. Assume all the facts of Evans, except that suit was not brought
until ten years after the private trustees took control of the park. The relevancy of the second
test has not altered, except that the "common understanding" requirement may no longer
be present. It is suggested that this is the key: that once the requirements of the second test
are met, they continue to be met notwithstanding private performance, so long as the com-
mon understanding that it is a public function still exists. As a practical matter, the more
time that has elapsed since private performance began, or the greater the number of private
performers, the more difficult it will be to demonstrate such a common understanding.
100. The following are hypothetical situations. As noted by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 163 (including n. 14), the Supreme Court has not considered
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test.'"' However, if a specific school, or a specific form of education, could
meet the narrower view of exclusivity in the second (Evans) test, then the
public function doctrine would apply if the other parts of that test were
also met. If only the state had operated medical schools and it was re-
garded as a public function, a new private medical school would be held
to the constitutional standards. Similarly, if a city operated the only voca-
tional schools, but a nearby city had private vocational schools, arguably
the local citizens might not regard that activity as a public function.
2. Police
General police functions are actually performed by virtually every state
and/or local government, annd in most cases both tests would be satisfied;
but not all potential police functions are performed by all police depart-
ments. The question would be whether a particular police function has
been exclusively performed for the citizens of an area by any public police
department. If an area had never been served by any public agency per-
forming police functions, then a private police department, even if regu-
lated, would not be subject to the public function doctrine. If there had
been such public agency provision, and the public served considered it to
be a public function prior to the time the private party began performing,
then the public function doctrine would apply.
3. Fire Protection
Fire departments do not exist everywhere, and there is no state agency
that would provide most of the services associated with them. As a re-
sult, it is less likely that the doctrine will be applied to fire prbtection than
to police functions. Where fire department functions are performed by the
state or its subdivision, however, the result would be the same as with
police functions. A volunteer fire department would not be subject to the
doctrine, even if regulated'0 2 and/or subsidized' by a public body, as long
as such function had not previously been performed by the municipality
any cases involving these functions, nor has the author located lower court decisions relating
to such functions in this context.
101. Education also fails the prerogative aspect of the first test, and only in rare circum-
stances would any facet of education meet this aspect. Thus, the second test would be the
more likely means of applying the public function doctrine, if at all.
102. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 353, 357.
103. "The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise private
entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort
of benefit or services at all from the State. . . ." Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
173 (1972). However, depending on the nature of the state aid, another (most likely the
"nexus") doctrine of state action may be invoked. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417
U.S. at 574.
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and the persons served had not regarded it as a public function before the
volunteer fire department was created. The public function dortrine would
also not apply to a particular function, such as a rescue squad, even though
there was a public fire department if it had never operated a rescue squad.
4. Tax Collection
Tax collection is a function which falls under the first test, since it is a
function traditionally associated with the state, only the state has the right
to levy taxes, and the state does in fact collect taxes. Thus, a private
agency which purchased delinquent tax accounts at a discount would be
subject to the public function doctrine when it attempted to collect such
accounts. Not withstanding the fact that the relationship beteen the pri-
vate agency and the state is merely contractual, all rights the private party
has against the delinquent taxpayer arise because the private party is
standing in place of the state. The private party is collecting not merely a
debt, but a debt which only the state or its delegate may collect.""
The collection of sales taxes by a merchant is another example. As both
tests indicate, the action complained of must result from the performance
of the function which is subject to the doctrine.' 5 An act by a merchant
would invoke the public function doctrine only if such act could be directly
related to the collection of the sales tax. Thus, the doctrine would not
apply to merely refusing to serve a customer, but would apply to a dispute
concerning the payment of the sales tax.
IV. CONCLUSION
The application of the public function doctrine nd riot be limited to
only a few functions, but a particular function will not result in the invoca-
tion of the doctrine under all circumstances. The two tests. described above
are not necessarily desirable, but they do give some indication of when the
Supreme Court will apply the doctrine to a given situation.
William A. Diamond
104. Potentially, at least, this may be an example of a function which meets the first but
not the second test. The contract between the state and the collection agency would fit the
second test only if it affected a class of persons. Arguably, however, it would affect certain
named persons (the delinquent taxpayers) but not a class as such. See note 73 supra.
105. See note 33 supra.
[Vol. 13:579
